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Abstract: The purpose of this paper is two-fold; to examine developments in trade and
investment policy regimes in Malaysia following the on-set of the financial crisis, using the
Trade Policy Review Malaysia 2001 of the WTO as a reference point; and to evaluate the Review
in terms of the objectives of the WTO Trade Policy Review Mechanism as set out in the
Marrakesh Agreement. It is found that, by and large Malaysia has managed to come out of the
crisis without compromising on its long-standing commitment to maintaining a relatively open
trade and investment policy regime by the regional standards. However, there are some
disturbing post-crisis developments, which deserve scrutiny in a future Review. These include
increase in the degree of dispersion of tariff rates because of high tariff peaks relating to a few
product lines, increased reliance on non-automatic import licensing to regulate imports of a
significant number of products which directly compete with domestic production by public sector
enterprises, and unexplained delays in meeting commitments under the General Agreement on
Trade in Services (GATS) 
JEL Classification:   F13, F14, O53
Forthcoming in The World Economy (Annual Issue: Global Trade Policy 2002)
Malaysian Trade Policy and the 2001 WTO Trade Policy Review
1. INTRODUCTION
The trade Policy Mechanism (TPRM) is a collective review process of the World Trade
Organisation that aims to contribute to improved adherence by Member countries to rules
and commitments set out in the WTO Agreement.1 Under the TPRM, trade and related
policies of member countries are examined and evaluated at regular intervals by the
Trade Policy Review Body (TPRB), a full-membership body of equal ranking to the
General Council and the Dispute Settlement Body. Each country review is based on two
reports independently prepared by the WTO Secretariat (the main report) and the
government of the country under review covering all aspects of the trade policies,
including the domestic laws and regulations, the institutional framework; bilateral,
regional and other preferential agreements and the external environment.  The two reports
and the proceedings of the TPRB meetings are published under the general title of Trade
Policy Review [Country, Year]. These review reports, which are available both in printed
form and electronically (on the WTO website) from the Secretariat, have now become an
important part of the literature on global trade policy. The frequency of review of a given
country depends on its relative position in global trade. The four largest entities (the
European Union (EU), the United State, Japan and Canada – the so-called ‘Quad’’) are
reviewed very two years; the next 16 largest trading partners every four years; and the
remaining Members every six years, with a long interval envisaged for the least-
1 The TPRM was first established at the GATT Secretariat on a trial and error basis in April 1988
as a key accomplishment of the mid-term review of the Uruguay Round. It was subsequently
incorporated into the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organisation. Under
the GATT the focus of TPRM was limited only to policies and practices governing commodity
trade.  Under the WTO the focus was extended to cover trade in services and trade related aspects
of intellectual property rights. For details on the modalities, operation and the challenges faced
by the TPRM see Keesing 1998, Blakehurst 1999 and Laird 1999. 
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developed countries. By June 2002, a total of 149 reviews had been conducted covering
77 WTO member countries.
As a middle-ranking trading nation, Malaysia is on the four-year review circle.
The TPRB concluded its third review of Malaysia during 3-5 December 2001.2 The
Trade Policy Review: Malaysia 2001 (henceforth referred to as the TPR 2001) provides a
comprehensive survey of trade policy making in Malaysia during 1997-2001 in the
context of changes in overall economic policy and institutional developments. This is a
highly timely publication. It will be valued by the trade policy analysts not only for the
purpose of assessing Malaysia’s performance in meeting commitments under the WTO
Agreement, but also as a essential reference for studying the implications of Malaysia’s
unorthodox policy response to the recent financial crisis for her long-term commitment to
maintaining an open trade and investment policy regimes.
The purpose of this paper is to surveys recent developments in Malaysian trade
policy from a historical perspective, using the 2002 TPR review as a reference point. It
begins with an overview of Malaysia’s economic performance during the post-
independence era, paying attention to the underlying political economy (Section 2). This
section aims to supplements the background discussion in the TPR 2001on the economic
environment and trade policy regimes (Chapters 1 and 2) in providing a framework for
assessing recent policy trends. Section 3 ketches out main facets of current trade policy
regime, with emphasis on policy shifts following the on-set of the financial crisis. Section
4 provides a critical evaluation of the TPR 2001 in terms of the purpose of the TPRM as
set out in Annex 3 of the Marrakesh Agreement (WTO 1995). The final section presents
concluding remarks.
2
 The two previous reviews were conducted in 1990 and 1996.
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2. TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT IN MALAYSIA:  AN OVERVIEW3
Malaysia is considered as one of the great development success stories in the developing
world. While Malaysia’s economic performance was impressive by developing-country
standards over the entire four decades of independence, the achievements were
particularly impressive in the decade before the onset of the Asian financial crisis in
1997. During this period Malaysia had one of the highest growth rates (about 9 per cent
per annum) in the world (Figure 1). Sustained rapid growth was accompanied by a
dramatic decline in the rate of unemployment and rising living standards, and remarkably
low inflation. The financial crisis severely disrupted the Malaysian economy and in 1998
real GDP contracted by a staggering 7.5. But, with the help of an unorthodox policy
package, which provided for expediting recovery though reflationary macroeconomic
policy without deviating from the country’s commitment to liberal trade and foreign
direct investment policies, the economy recovered quickly, regaining the pre-crisis
growth momentum by 2000. 
Figure 1 about here
(a) Economic Performance
In the 1970s and early 1980s, the economic expansion in Malaysia was predominantly
accounted for by primary sectors. Malaysia’s achievements during this period included
reaching agricultural food self-sufficiency by the mid-1970s, maintaining its supremacy
in the world natural rubber market by remarkable improvement in efficiency of
production through a replanting scheme, and reduction in the vulnerability of the
plantation sector to vagaries of the world rubber prices by successful diversification into
palm oil and coco. From the late 1980s, much of growth has come from the expansion of
manufacturing. Between 1987 and 1997, the manufacturing sector grew at an average
annual rate of 14 percent, almost double the rate of expansion achieved in the previous
ten years. The share of manufacturing in GDP increased from about 20 percent to over
34 percent during this period, contributing to over 50 percent of the increment in GDP.
3 The data used in this section, unless otherwise indicated, come from the Economic Survey,
Ministry of Finance, Kuala Lumpur (various issues).
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In addition, much of output expansion in the tertiary (service) sectors in recent years has
been closely related to the expansion of the manufacturing sector. The share of the
agriculture in GDP declined from over 20 per cent in the mid-1980s to less than 9 per
cent by the turn of the century, when the economy started to face severe labour shortages
(Table 1).
Table 1 about here
As in the other high performing East Asian countries, rapid export orientation was
the whole-mark of industrial transformation in Malaysia. By the mid-1990s, with
manufacturing accounting for 80 per cent to total exports of the country, Malaysia had
become the sixth largest exporter of manufactured goods in the developing world, after
the four Newly Industrialised countries in East Asia (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong
and Singapore) and China (WTO 2001). At first, Malaysia’s market niches in
manufactured exports were in simple assembly operations in electronics and electrical
goods, and standards light manufactures such as clothing, footwear and rubber goods.
From about the mid-1990s, the export composition began to diversify into mature
technology final products such as radios, TVs, cameras and computers. But by the turn of
the century semiconductors and other electronics components still accounted for over 45
per cent of total merchandise exports. Most of these ‘products’ consist of simple
assembly operations, although some electronics firms have entered into higher value
added fabrication and design activities. From the late 1980s Malaysia has been the largest
developing-country exporter (and one of the world's major exporters) of electronic
components, particularly integrated circuits. Foreign direct investment (FDI) has played
a pivotal role in export-led industrialisation. Foreign firms accounted for over 45 percent
of total manufacturing value added and over three-quarters of total manufactured exports
by the mid-1990s exports (Athukorala and Menon 1999). 
Rapid export-led growth was accompanied by a persistent decline in the
unemployment rate, which had reached a peak of 8.5% by the mid 1980s. By the mid
1990s the Malaysian economy was at virtual full-employment, with an unemployment
rate of only 2.8 percent (Figure 1). The strong expansion of modern sector employment,
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the decline in unemployment and, more recently increasing wages, in turn contributed to
reduction of poverty and promotion of equity. The incidence of poverty among all
households (as measured by the percentage of total households below the poverty line)
fell from 18.4 percent in 1984 to 0.6 percent in 1997. A significant decline was
observable for both urban and rural households, even though the incidence of poverty
was still relatively high in rural areas. Following the onset of the financial crisis, the
unemployment rate rose to 3.3% in 1998, but declined to the pre-crisis level by 2000,
without leaving any discernable impact on impressive record of poverty reduction.  While
less impressive than its record in reducing absolute poverty, Malaysia has also been
successful (by the standards of developing countries at the same stage of development) in
addressing inequality in the size distribution of income (relative poverty). Between 1970
and 1995, the Gini coefficient fell from 0.51 in 1980 to 0.44 in 1990 and stayed about the
same in the ensuing years, suggesting that both the rich and the poor benefited from
export-led growth. The quality of life also improved in terms of various indicators. For
instance, the literacy rate increased from about 30 in the late 1950s to 90 percent by the
turn of the century. In 2000, life expectancy was 70 (up from 40 in the late 1950s),
which was only 6 years behind the average for the developed countries. According to the
Human Development Index (HDI) of the United Nations - a composite index of literacy,
infant mortality and life expectancy - Malaysia ranked fourth (after Saudi Arabia, South
Korea and Mauritius) in the world in terms of improvement in living standards in the past
three decades (UN 2001).
This performance record looks all the more impressive when viewed against the
mixed prognoses of development prospects for Malaysia at independence in 1957 (then
the Federation of Malaya).4 Of course, Malaysia had some initial advantages such as
rich and diversified natural resource endowment, and well-developed infrastructure and
an efficient administrative mechanism inherited from the colonial era. Subsequently
Malaysia also greatly benefited from it geography, the location in a high growth region.
But these non-policy factors were not unique to Malaysia. At the same time, Malaysian
4 In the famous Rosentein-Rodan (1961) growth trajectory up to 1976 for sixty-six of to-days
developing countries Malaysia was classified in the 'low-growth' category. A number of other
countries newly emerged from the colonial era - in particular India, Pakistan, Ghana, Kenya, and
Burma were identified as having much superior growth prospects.
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policy makers had to face formidable challenges arising from a pluralistic society
characterised by deep ethnic division and unequal distribution of income and wealth
along ethnic lines.5 The consensus view of various recent prognoses of the Malaysian
economic success is that the key to success was sound economic policy (Bhalla and
Kharas 1992, Selleh and Meyanathan 1993, Snodgrass 1995, Athukorala and Menon
1999). The Malaysian development policy reflects a unique combination of outward-
oriented development strategy6 and a comprehensive affirmative action program aimed at
maintaining ethnic harmony and social stability.
(b) Policy Trends
Like in many other developing countries, industrialisation through import substitution
was a key emphasis of the Malaysian development strategy in the 1950s and 1960s (Alavi
1996). But Malaysian policy makers, unlike their counterparts in other countries, never
resorted to non-tariff protection and direct government involvement in manufacturing
through setting up of public sector enterprises as means of ‘promoting’ industrialisation.
Moderate tariff protection was by and large the key instrument used in encouraging new
investment in manufacturing. Tariff protection to domestic manufacturing in Malaysia
has also been low relative to other developing countries (Power 1971). The role of the
government was by and large limited to the provision of conventional public services and
implementation of rural development schemes. As already noted, unlike in most other
developing countries, there was no direct government involvement in manufacturing
though the establishment of state-owned enterprises (SOEs).
Economic expansion during the 1950s and the 1960, although respectable, failed
to make a substantial contribution towards solving the “special” problems of the Malays.
With urban unemployment rising, and education and language again looming as issues,
non-Malays began to question the extent to which their interests were being safeguarded
5 At the time of independence, the native Malays, who accounted for 52 percent of the
population, were relatively poor and involved mostly in low-productive agricultural activities.
The ethnic Chinese (37 percent of the population) enjoyed greater economic power and
dominated most of the modern-sector activities.
6 In a recent comprehensive study of the patterns and chronology of trade policy reforms during
the postwar era, Sachs and Warner (1995, Table 1) identify Malaysia as one of the eight
developing countries whose trade regimes remained open throughout the post-Second World War
period.
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in the new Malaysia. The disenchantment growing among all segments of the population
ultimately erupted in the bloody communal riots of 13 May 1969. This event gave birth to
a weeping affirmative action policy, the New Economic Policy (NEP), which came into
effect in 1970 (later modified and renamed National Development Policy, NDP, in 1990)
(Leigh 1992, Snodgrass 1995).  The overriding objective of NEP was to maintain national
unity through the pursuance of two objectives: eradication of poverty among the entire
population and restructuring of the Malaysian society so that the identification of race
with economic function and geographical location is reduced. These objectives were to
be ached through a wide range of direct redistribution polices including privileged access
to subsidised credits, modern sector employment, and share ownership in private
enterprises for the native Malays (Bumiputra). But the resource cost of these direct
redistribution policies was not a major drag on growth because the government continued
to maintain an outward oriented overall policy stance. Given that the trade and foreign
investment regimes continued to remain open, and the government by and large
continued to maintain its firm commitment to basic rules of ‘good governance’ (in
particular maintaining macroeconomic stability, developing economic infrastructure, and
preserving private property rights) there was ample room for the private sector to expand
through greater integration in the global economy.
There was a heavy emphasis on the promotion of heavy industries through direct
government involvement in the first half of 1980s, as part of the ‘look East’ policy of Dr
Mahathir who became Prime Minister in 1981 (Chee 1994). The Heavy Industries
Corporation of Malaysia (HICOM), a public-sector holding company, was formed in
1980 to go into partnership with foreign companies in setting up industries in areas such
as petrochemicals; iron and steel; cement; paper and paper products; machinery and
equipment; general engineering; transport equipment; and building materials. The symbol
of the selective industrial policy was the Proton (the Malaysian national car) project,
which was set up by HICOM in collaboration with the Mitsubishi Corporation in Japan.
By 1987, there were 867 corporate public enterprises in Malaysia, more than a third of
which were in manufacturing. Tariffs on a wide range of manufactured goods were
increased in the first half of 1980s as part of the heavy-industrialisation move. But there
was no significant reliance of quantitative import restrictions; only 8 percent of total
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merchandise imports (on an import-weighted basis) were under such restrictions by the
mod-1980s (Menon 1999, Table 1). By the mid-1990s, only 3 percent of all import tariff
lines (accounting for about 4.5 per cent of annual import value) were subject to licensing
requirements. 
The economic crisis during 1985-87, which originated in a combination of budget
deficits caused by the heavy industrialisation move and adverse trends in prices of
Malaysia's major export products (Corden 1996), put an end to the state-led heavy
industrialisation push. The crisis management policy package placed greater emphasis on
the role of the private sector and strengthening the conditions for export-oriented
industrialisation through greater participation of FDI. The structural adjustment reform
package introduced in response to the crisis involved a gradual process of privatisation
and restructuring of state-owned enterprises. By the early 1990s state-ownership in
manufacturing was limited only to some politically sensitive ventures in automobile
manufacturing (the Proton project), petrochemical, iron and steel and cement industries
(Kanapathy 2000). The Promotion of Investment Act of 1986 introduced fresh, more
generous incentives for private investors, and some of the ethnic requirements on
company ownership of the NEP were relaxed. The reforms after the mid-1980s also
involved significant tariff reductions and removal of quantitative import restrictions7,
removing restrictions on foreign portfolio investment in the country, a gradual process of
privatisation and restructuring of state-owned enterprises and labour market reforms to
make Malaysia more cost-competitive as a location of international production. 
In the early 1990s, Prime Minister Mahathir came up with a policy blueprint (the
Vision 2020 Statement) for transforming Malaysia to developed-country status by the
year 2020.8 Most of these proposals - in particular those relating to the provision of
infrastructure, maintaining macroeconomic stability, human capital development and
commitment to a more equitable distribution of fruits of economic growth - simply
7 The economy-wide import-weighted tariff rate declined from 14.7 during 1984-87 to 8.7 per
cent by the mid-1990s, the lowest in Southeast and South Asia (Menon 2000, Table 1; ADB 1997
p. 96). By the mid-1990s, only 3 percent of all import tariff lines (accounting for about 4.5 per
cent of annual import value) were subject to licensing requirements.
8 Government programs and procedures for achieving these goals were embodied in the Seventh
Malaysia Plan (1996-2000) and the Second Industrial Master Plan released in 1996.
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reconfirm the long-standing commitment of the Malaysian government to good
governance. However, the new policy also introduced a plethora of new incentives
geared to industrial upgrading and strengthening domestic linkages of the manufacturing
sectors, which opened up new opportunities for policy-maker desecration. However, the
long-standing commitment to private-sector oriented growth in the context of an open
trade and investment regime continued to remain the basic tenet of Malaysia’s national
development strategy. 
(c ) Policy Response to the Financial Crisis
The impressive growth trajectory of Malaysia was shattered by the currency crisis in late
1997. The currency and stock market turmoil that began in July 1997 was quickly
translated into economic collapse.
Unlike the other three crisis countries, Malaysia succumbed to the crisis with only
a little foreign debt exposure of its banking system. For this reason, the Malaysian policy
markers were able to face the crisis without entering into an IMF-sponsored rescue
package. However, for almost one-and-a-half years following the onset of the crisis,
policy indecisiveness seriously hampered the recovery process. It was difficult for the
Malaysian authorities to mobilise foreign financing for crisis management because of the
market perception that Malaysia would be less committed to the required reforms since it
was not under an IMF program. To make matters worse, the massive private sector
domestic bank debts in the lead-up to the crisis9, constrained the use the interest rate
policy to support the exchange rate in face of continuing capital outflow. By mid-1998,
the economy was in its worst recession during the post-independence era and there were
no signs of achieving currency and share price stability.
In this volatile economic climate, the Malaysian government had to choose
between two alternatives. The first was to obtain a ‘good housekeeping seal’ on its
policies from the IMF. This would, like in Korea and Thailand, have stabilized the
exchange rate, setting the stage for applying the Keynesian therapy to speed up the
9 At the time Malaysia had by far the largest bank credit to GDP ratio (165%) among the crisis-
hit Asian countries (and in the world at large).
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recovery. The second option was to embark on a capital-control based macroeconomic
stimulation package; to insulate the domestic financial markets from short-term financial
flows through capital controls with a view to enabling vigorous pursuance of monetary
and fiscal expansion, and undertaking banking and corporate restructuring. The first
alternative was not politically acceptable to the Malaysian leadership. Given the intimate
links developed between business and government under the NEP program, naturally the
positive stabilizing impact of any policy move had to be weighed against its potential
negative effect on socio-political stability of the country (Crouch 1998). Thus the
Malaysian leadership opted for the second alternative, ending the policy uncertainty that
had pervaded the policy scene for almost a year. 
The purpose of capital outflow controls in the new policy package was to make it
harder for short-term portfolio investors and offshore hedge funds to drive down the
currency. Thus these controls were confined to short-term capital flows only. With the
exception of limits on foreign exchange for foreign travel by Malaysian citizens, there
was no retreat from the country’s long-standing commitment to an open trade and
investment policy. Profit remittances and repatriation of capital related to FDI in the
country continued to remain free of control. Moreover, some new measures were
introduced to further encourage FDI participation in the economy. These included
allowing 100% foreign ownership of new investment made before 31 December 2000 in
domestic manufacturing regardless of the degree of export orientation; increasing the
foreign ownership share in the telecommunication project from 30% to 69% (under the
condition that the ownership share is brought down to 49% after five years), and in stock-
broking companies and insurance sector from a previous uniform level of 30% to 49%
and 51% respectively; and relaxing restrictions on foreign investment in landed property
to allow foreigners to purchase all types of properties above RM 250,000 in new projects
or projects which are  less than 50% completed.
1998 Budget speech unveiled on 17 October, Import duties on automobiles, vans
and motorcycles were increased from 30-200% to 40-300% for CBU (completely built-
up) and 4-42% to 30-80% for CKD (completely knocked down) and construction
equipment from 0-35% to 5-50%. In addition a number of heavy and construction
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equipment, hot and cold rolled flat products of iron or non-alloy steel, ephedrine and its
salts, chemical products, certain electrical household goods were brought under non-
automatic import licensing. The declared purpose of these measures was to bring down
the current account deficit, but cushioning local producers (including the national car
producer, Proton) against domestic demand contraction was obviously a key motivating
factor.
The Malaysian economy began to recover from its worst recession during the
post-independence era for about the second quarter of 1999. By mid-2000 the economy
was back to the post-crisis output level. Although the expansion of export-oriented
industries aided by the recovery in the global electronics industry played an important
role, the recovery was not entirely export-led. Domestic demand expansion triggered by
expansionary macroeconomic policy played a pivotal role in achieving a broad-based
recovery. Moreover, the fixed exchange rate is belied to have helped the recovery process
by preventing premature exchange rate appreciation as part of improved market
sentiments about the recovery prospects. Capital controls also assisted banking and
corporate restructuring by facilitating the mobilization of domestic resources, and more
importantly, providing a cushion against adverse market sentiments of improper practices
of protecting favoured companies and corporations (Athukorala 2001, Corden 2002). 
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3. CURRENT TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES
This section provides a broad-brush picture of the current trade policy regime in Malaysia
drawing upon TPR 2001 and supplementing it with additional information for comparing
the Malaysian experience with that of the other major economies in the region.
Following the format of the TPR we first discuss the broad sweep of trade policy
focussing on the key instruments (measures), followed by a discussion of sectoral
policies.
a. Trade Policies and Practices by Measure
(i) Import Tariffs
As already noted, tariffs have continued to be the main border measure affecting
Malaysia’s import trade throughout the post-independence period. The current tariff
structure (as of end 2001) contains 10,368 tariff lines (9-digit HS level) and involves 73
different rates. As a result of the conversion of some specific, compound, and alternative
duties into ad valorem rates following the singeing of the WTO Agreement in 1995, the
share of total lines with non-ad-valorem tariffs declined from 4.5% of tariff lines in 1997
to only 0.7% in 2001. There are no tariff quotas or variable import levies.
The tariff increases introduced in 1998 (see above) have resulted in a mild, yet
notable, reversal in the declining trend in the average nominal tariff rate maimed from the
mid 1980s (Menon 2000, Table 1). The average applied MFN tariff increased from 8.1%
in 1997 to 9.2% in 2001 (Table 2). Average level of nominal tariff protection is lower
than that indicated by the simple average applied MNF average owing to various tariff
concessions, often for capital and intermediate inputs, as well as preferential rates,
particularly those favouring ASEAN countries under AFTA. The ration of actual import
duty collected to total value of merchandise imports (the implicit nominal duty rate) in
fact declined from 3% in 1997 to 1.3% in 2000.
 
Table 2 about here
The degree of dispersion tariff rates measured by the coefficient of variation
increased from 91% in 1988 to 170% in 1997 and then to 210% in 2001, reflecting the
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increase in the number of tariff lines with rates less than 10% and higher than 20% (Table
2). By contrast, domestic tariff peaks (lines with tariff rates exceeding three times the
simple average tariff rate as a percentage of total tariff lines) have declined. Tariff peaks
apply, inter alia, to automobiles, beverages, textiles and clothing. 
Malaysia bound only 65% of its tariff lines in 1995 and the bound list has
remained unchanged during the ensuing years. Moreover the bound rates are much higher
than the applied MFN rates. Both these features of the tariff structure have provides the
government with scope to raise applied tariffs (as was done in 1998), imparting a degree
of uncertainty to applied tariffs. 
The increases in nominal tariff rates in recent years have largely been confined to
products in final stage of processing (Table 2). Nearly 60% of total tariff lines, which
relate mostly to inputs to domestic industry (that is, products in the first stage of
processing and the semi-process products) continued to remain duty free. A large
number of dutiable imported inputs also benefited from some tariff reductions. This
cascading pattern of the tariff structure implies that the effective rate of protection
enjoyed by domestic manufacturing would have considerably increased during the review
period. 
Malaysia is a founding member of the Association of the South East Asian
nations (ASEAN) and the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA). Malaysia has agreed
to provide tariff preferences to the AFTA member countries on 8,764 tariff lines under
the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) scheme of AFTA. Tariffs on these
product lines are to be reduced to a range of 0 to 5% by the end of 2002. Starting in
1993, Malaysia has progressively placed 96% of the agreed tariff lines under the CEPT
scheme. To date, 96% of Malaysia’s tariff lines have been transferred to the CEPT
scheme. Two thirds of these tariff lines are duty free. Malaysia has obtained AFTA
approval for not including automobile products (218 tariff lines) into CEPT scheme until
2005 in view of the difficulties faced by the domestic automobile industry. Tariff
preferences granted under the CEPT scheme are subject to the fulfilment of rules of
origin criteria, which have been set at minimum 40% local or regional value added. 
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In addition to the tariff preferences granted under the CEPT scheme, Malaysia
provides the other five original member countries of the ASEAN10 tariff preferences
under ASEAN Preferential Trading Agreement (APTA) signed in 1997. APTA cover all
products that are not included in the CEPT scheme and the preferential rates are 50% to
100% lower than the respective MFN rates. Between 1997 and 2001, the simple average
of AFTA tariff decreased from 4.7% to 3.9%, as against an increase in the average MFN
rate from rose from 8.1% to 9.2%.  
The widening gap between the average MFN tariffs and the significant tariff
preferences granted under the CEPT and APTA schemes, coupled with the widening gap
between APTA and MFN rates, have set the stage for potential diversion of Malaysia’s
trade from non-AFTA trading partners to AFTA countries. No systematic study of such
trade diversion has yet been undertaken. The share of imports from AFTA countries in
total imports of Malaysia increased from 18% to over 23% between 1996 and 1999, but
this increase cannot be ascribed to trade diversion alone. Various other factors, including
the significant depreciation of ASEAN currencies against non-ASEAN currencies in the
wake of the Asian financial crisis and the growing important intra-regional cross-border
trade in components in within vertically integrated manufacturing production (in
particular electronics and motor vehicle industries) many have contributed increase in
intra-regional trade. 
Table 3 compares Malaysia’s tariff structure in 2000 (the latest year for with
comparable data are available) with that of the major trading nations in the region.
Despite recent tariff increases Malaysia’s average tariff rate is relatively low (both in
terms of the simple average and import-weighted average) by the regional standards.
However, the degree of dispersion of tariff in Malaysia (measured by the coefficient of
variation) is relatively high because of high tariff peaks relating to a few product lines,
motor vehicles in particular.
10
  Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Brunei.
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Table 3 about here
(ii) Non-tariff Barriers (NTBs)  
There are no import quotas in Malaysia and the existing import prohibitions are limited
only to those implemented for national security reasons. However, some agricultural and
industrial products have continued to remain under import licensing. As noted, following
the onset of the recent financial crisis the licensing list was widen to cover a number of
heavy and construction equipment, iron and steel products, industrial chemicals and
certain electrical household goods. Consequently, the number of tariff lines subject to a
non-automatic import licensing requirements increased from 17% in 1996 to 27.3% in
1997 (WTO 2002, P 39). The import restraining effect of these controls are not known,
but there is circumstantial evidence that the degree of restrictiveness involved in the
licensing process has increased following the onset of the crisis.
In 1998 and 1999, Malaysia revised its anti-dumping and countervailing
legislation with a view to bringing it into conformity with the WTO agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. But unlike many other WTO member countries,
Malaysia has not relied heavily on contingent measures for controlling imports; during
1997-2001 Malaysia initiated only five anti-dumping investigations (of which three were
provisional measures).11   Currently there is no safeguard legislation in Malaysia.
As part of commitments of the WTO agreement on Trade Related Investment
Measures (TRIMS), Malaysia abolished all local content requirements measures on 31
December 2000, except those in the motor vehicle sector. Malaysia requested an
extension of the transition period until 2005 for eliminating local-content requirements in
the automobile sector as a condition for establishing a new industry. In compliance with
the Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), Malaysia has
enacted two new legislation (the Layout Design of Integrated Circuits Act 2000 and the
Geographical Indications Act 2000) and has amended the Patents Act 1983, Trade Marks
11 Total number of antidumping cases notified by the member countries to the WTO in 1999
amounted to 360, up from 150 in 1998.
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Act 1976, the Copyright Act 1987, and the Industrial Designs Act 1996 (WTO 2002 p.
19). 
Malaysia is not a party to the Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA),
though it does participate in the WTO working group on transparency in government
procurement. Government procurement procedures in Malaysia, notably preferential
margins, tend to favour locally owned businesses, particularly where relatively small
amounts are involved. Foreign suppliers are usually excluded for contracts of large
amounts unless the supplies or services are not available locally; foreign contractors are
allowed to participate if there is no local expertise. It eliminated other local-content
requirements tied to investment incentives. There are no non-preferential rules of origin
impacting on imports. 
(iii) Export Taxes and Subsidies
Some primary products, notable forest products, crude oil, and selected palm oil products
are subject to export duties. In 2000 these duties contributed to about 2% tax revenues. A
few agricultural products are also subject to prohibitions, restraints, and licensing
requirements.  
There are no export duties on manufactured products. On the contrary, assistance
is provided to manufactured exports through import tariff concessions, tax exceptions,
export credit, export insurance and export credit guarantees, export promotion and
marketing assistance. In addition Malaysia maintains two types of facilities for export
processing with minimum customs formalities; licensed manufacturing warehouses and
free zones. Malaysia is committed to phasing out these export subsidies in the
manufacturing sector over eight years, to bring them in conformity with the WTO
Agreement.
(iv) Other Measures affecting production and trade
Over the past five years, Malaysia has taken initiatives to gradually bring domestic
product standards into line with international norms. About 31% of the 2,862 Malaysian
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standards currently in force are aligned with or based on international standards. But 80%
of the new standards developed by Malaysia in 1998 and 1999 correspond to
international standards. During the period under review, Malaysia enacted two new laws
and amended four others to strengthen the protection of intellectual property rights and
bring domestic legislation into conformity with the TRIP Agreement. It has also stepped
up enforcement of IPR laws, especially those pertaining to copyrights.  
The government has a privatisation program dating back to 1987. But state-owned
enterprises still continue to play an important role in the economy. As of 2000 there were
37 state-owned enterprises or non-financial public enterprises (NFPEs) involved in
manufacturing, mining and petroleum, and services sector (electricity, transportation,
telecommunications, and postal activities). The development expenditure by NFPEs
represented more than 50% of total public state expenditure during the period 1996-2000.
(WTO, 2002, p 65). Apart from their own operations, some of these enterprises provide
finance not just to each other, but also to private companies. State owned enterprises play
an important role in the Malaysian economy, especially in petroleum, transport,
telecommunication, postal and electricity industries. In December 2000, 40 companies in
which the State has substantial share represented 5% of companies listed on the Kuala
Lumpur Stock Exchange and they accounted for 30.3% of the total market capitalisation
of all listed companies. 
Malaysia does not have a comprehensive competition law or other laws that
regulate the activities of enterprises and protect consumer interest. However, the
government has recently established some competition guidelines with a view to
fostering competition in telecommunications. As part of corporate restructuring
following the on-set of the crisis, the government also has taken some initiatives to
improve corporate governance in Malaysia, including introducing disclosure
requirements and monitoring insider share trading. 
(b) Trade Policy by Sector
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At the sectoral level, overall Malaysia maintains liberal agricultural policies, especially as
far as non-tariff border measures are concerned. Generally speaking, import tariffs on
agricultural products (HS chapters 01-24) are low, averaging 0.5% in 2001, if non-ad
valorem duties are excluded. However, a wide range of agricultural imports is subject to
import licensing. 
Non-border measures, notably production subsides are also used to support
domestic (non-plantation) agriculture. The total government outlay on these support
measures amounted to RM 995 million in 1998 (the latest year for which data are
available). The rice sector stands out as the single most assisted agricultural activity.
The government assists rice producers with a comprehensive fertilizer subsidy, a
guaranteed minimum price and a price subsidy scheme. Poverty reduction and food
security are often cited as the main rationale behind such policy. Under the guaranteed
minimum price scheme, BERNAS (a privatised enterprise involved in state trading)
undertakes to buy paddy from farmers at not less than the guaranteed minimum prices.
Under the paddy price subsidy scheme, the government makes fixed payments to farmers
for the paddy sold by them to any commercial rice mills. Total expenditure in 1998 on
the three schemes amounted to RM 547 million (US$ 150) or nearly 55% total production
subsidies. 
Import tariffs on mining products (including crude petroleum and gas) were
eliminated in 1997. They are not subject to any import restrictions, except for barite,
which requires import licence. Currently there is no export duty on petroleum products;
while exports of crude oil and tin are subject to export duties at 10% and 0-25%,
respectively.
The wholly state-owned company, PERTONAS (established under the Petroleum
Development Act 1974) continues to be the main vehicle for the appropriation of
resource rents from oil and gas; it has exclusive rights of ownership, exploration and
production, and is responsible for planning, investment, and regulation of all activities
relating to exploration of petroleum products. Foreign investment or participation in the
upstream industry (processing and refining of petroleum and the manufacture of
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petrochemical products) is accepted in the form of production-sharing contracts (PSC);
by the end of 2000, PETRONAS had signed more that 60 PSCs with foreign companies.
Foreign equity participation up to 100% is permitted in the mining sector depending on
the level of investments, technology and risk involved in the project, the availability of
Malaysian expertise in the exploration and mining, and the level of domestic value added.
The total number of duty free import lines relating to manufactured imports
increased from 4155 to 4336 between 1997 and 2001. Tariffs on selected manufactured
goods have been reduced either on unilateral basis or under the WTO commitments.
However the average tariff rate for manufactured imports increased from 6.4% to 8.2%
because of increases in tariffs on automobiles, construction equipment, certain appliances
and alcoholic beverages in 1998. As already noted, a number of manufactured goods are
also subject to discretionary import licensing for public health, security as well as for
protection purposes. Exports of manufactured products enjoy virtual free trade status
through export duty exemptions, duty drawback facilities and free trade zone status.
Exports are also exempted from sales tax.  
Heavy protection given to automobile industry remains a major anomaly in
Malaysia’s structure of industrial protection. The domestic automobile market is
protected through both tariff and non-tariff measures. Following the latest increases in
October 1997, currently automobile tariff range from 42% to 80% on completely
knocked down (CKD) cars, and from 140% to 300% on completely built up (CBU) cars.
Most automobile parts and components, except tractor parts (duty free) are subject to
25-30% tariffs. Motor vehicles, chassis fitted with engine for automobiles and motor
vehicles, chassis not fitted with engine and parts thereof, bodies for ambulances, and road
tractors for semi-trailers are subject to discretionary import licensing. A number of
internal taxes, such as tax sales tax at 10%, exercise tax at various rates, and road taxes
based on engine capacity are imposed on all vehicles. The national cars, Proton and
Perodua, receive 50% reduction in exercise tax. All assemblers and manufacturers
including the two national car companies must source certain percentage of parts and
components locally (WTO 2002, p. 77). The Given heavy protection; domestic
production naturally accounts for the lions’ share (over 90%) of the domestic car market.
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Despite various export incentives offered, exports of automobile products accounted for a
mere 0.4% of total merchandise exports in 1999 (WTO 2002, p. 75).
Until 1998 full foreign ownership was allowed only in export-oriented
manufacturing ventures. As part of new incentives offered for foreign investors following
the onset of the financial crisis full foreign equity participation was allowed for newly
approved on or before December 2000 (subsequently extended to December 2003).
However, activities that involve small and medium-sized enterprises, like paper
packaging, plastic packaging, metal stamping and fabrication, wire harness, and printing
excluded from this relaxation. Foreign equity participation in these industries is limited to
30% if the products are domestic-market oriented.
The services sector, which accounts for over half of GDP, is not as open to trade
as agriculture and manufacturing. Foreign commercial presence is generally confined to
joint ventures in which combined foreign ownership cannot normally exceed 30%. The
Malaysian government has already signed the Information Technology Agreement and
the Fourth and Fifth Protocols of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)
concerning basic telecommunication services and financial services respectively. But the
progress with implementing the proposed reforms has much slower than anticipated. 
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4. ASSESSING THE REVIEW
Like the two previous reviews, the TPR 2001 is a useful basic source of information on
recent changes and the current state of trade and foreign investment policies and the
related domestic polices in Malaysia. The report is particularly commendable given the
severe staffing and financial constraints under which the WTO Secretariat operates
(Keesing 1998, Blackhurst 1998). There are, however, many areas in which more
analysis could have been done.
As number of participants of the TPRB meetings have indicated the discussion on
the capital-control based recovery package introduced in October 1998 is rather sketchy
and does not provides a balance treatment of various opinions about role in speeding up
the recovery process. The authors of the Review seems to support the view that the
imposition of controls on capital outflow by the Malaysian government was simply a
ritualistic locking of the barn door after the horse was stolen. This is a misleading view
because the purpose of controls was to set the stage for monetary expansion by
preventing outflow of funds, both local and foreign-owned (particularly the former given
that much of the short-term capital had already left the country), in response to lowering
of domestic interest rate relative to world market rates. The potential threat of such
outflow was much greater in Malaysia than in the other crisis-hit countries because of the
pivotal role played by the Singapore money market as a convenient alternative to the
domestic market for the Malaysian investor. 
There is evidence that, once the Malaysian authorities decided to deviate from the
IMF route and followed the conventional Keynesian recipe for crisis management, capital
controls did play a useful role in providing a conducive setting for the effective pursuance
of such policies. Against the popular perception that short-term capital flows cannot be
controlled in a highly trade oriented economy, the Malaysian evidence suggests these
flows can be effectively regulated (at least on the margin), provided the controls are
specifically targeted at capital account transactions (Ito 2000, Athukorala 2001, Corden
2002). One can still disputes the argument that controls have played a ‘special role’ in
delivering a superior recovery outcome for Malaysia (compared to the IMF-program
22
countries) for want of counterfactuals. However, the fact remains that the new policy
measures enabled Malaysia to achieve recovery while minimising social costs and
economic disruptions associated with a more market-oriented path to reform. This itself
is a significant achievement because maintaining social harmony is an overriding concern
(quite apart from economic efficiency consideration) of economic policy making in
ethically diverse Malaysia (Crouch 1998). 
The bulk of the discussion on the structure of trade protection in the TPR 2001 is
on tariff barriers. In most cases the discussion on non-tariff barriers has not gone beyond
a simple listing of the instruments and the commodities covered. For instance, it points
to the recent increase in the reliance on import licensing, but there is little discussion of
implications of these increases for Malaysia import trade and relative incentives for
domestic industries. It is mentioned that licensing is ‘non-automatic’ without providing
any evidence about the extent to which the administrative discretion is used to regulate
trade flows. A close look at the commodity coverage of licensing suggests that a
significant number of these products directly compete with domestic production by
publici sector enterprises. It could well be that licensing is used in a more restrictive
manner in these areas to protect government monopolies at the expense of the private
sector. 
It is reported that so far Malaysia has by and large shunned the use of
antidumping procedures to as a new form of import protection. At first look, this is
indeed a positive development. But it could well be that there is no need to rely on anti-
dumping or other contingency measures as discretionary licensing act as a more effective
(hidden) tool of protection in the hand of the Malaysian authorities.
Another important element of trade and industry policy that has not received due
attention is export subsidies. Judging from the listing of various export subsidies in the
Review, despite Malaysia’s remarkable export success over the past two decades, still
export subsidies are an important item in the incentive structure. To what extent have
these subsidies been important in explaining the ‘export success’? Has it been based
primarily on sound economic fundamentals, while subsidies simply taking the form of
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unnecessary, costly transfers from the government to the export sectors? Answering these
and related questions is important in assessing the implications of promised dismantling
of export subsidies for Malaysia’s future growth prospects. 
Finally, the TPR has paid little attention to implications of Malaysia’s trade policy
for global trading system, even though this has been listed in the Marrakesh Agreement
as an important aspect of national trade and investment policy to be review under the
TPRM. An important subject, which should have received attention in this connection, is
the possible trade diversion effect of trade preferences under the CEPT scheme of the
AFTA. Another important related development that has been completely ignored in the
Review is the recent expansion of outward foreign direct investment from Malaysia. 
4. CONCLUSION
The Trade Policy Review: Malaysia 2001 is a valuable source of information for studying
recent developments and the current state of trade and investment policy in Malaysia.
However, its subject coverage is rather lopsided. Much of the Review is about tariffs.
The discussion on various non-tariff barriers (in particular non-discretionary licensing,
which seems to have gained in importance in recent years), government procurement
practices, export subsidies and agricultural production subsidies has not gone beyond
providing a chronology of events and listing of policies. The overall discussion on recent
policy changes in the TPR provides some clues about some notable deviation of
Malaysia’s trade policy stance from the country’s pre-crisis commitment to trade
liberalisation. But no attempt has been made to highlight these deviations, let alone
analysing their socio-political underpinnings and economic implications. Nor is there
any substantial assessment of the problems faced by Malaysia in meeting its remaining
commitments under the WTO.
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Table 1:  Malaysia: Sectoral Growth Performance
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1997 2000
(a)  Composition (%)
Agriculture 28.5 26.9 22.9 20.8 18.7 12.6 8.8
Industry 32.3 32.6 35.8 36.7 42.2 41.3 46.3
Manufacturing 15.8 17.3 19.6 19.5 26.9 34.2 32.6
Services** 33.5 40.5 41.3 42.6 39.1 38.9 44.9
GDP 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
(b) Average annual growth (%) 1970-75 1975-80 1980-85 1985-90 1990-97 1997-2000
Agriculture 9.5 5.1 3.1 4.6 2.4 -0.9
Industry 6.7 10.7 5.7 9.8 12.8 2.1
    Manufacturing 6.7 11.4 5.3 13.7 13.2 5.7
Services** 12.2 13.9 5.8 5.1 10.2 1.5
GDP 10.6 8.5 5.2 6.8 8.1 2
Notes: * Output shares and growth rates are based on constant (1978) prices. Growth rates
are annual averages between the reported years.
** Include import duties net of bank service charges.
Source: Ministry of Finance Malaysia, Economic Report (various issues)
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Table 2: Tariff Structure of Malaysia (MFN Tariff)
1988 1993 1997 2001
Number of tariff lines 12,183 11,875 10,372 10,368
Bound tariff lines1 (%) 0.8 0.8 63.7 63.5
Duty-free tariff lines1 (%) 10.3 13.4 58.6 58.3
Specific and mixed tariffs1(%) 22.2 12.0 4.5 0.7
Tariffs with no ad valorem equivalent1 (%) 7.4 5.9 4.5 0.7
Simple average applied rate (%) 17.5 15.2 8.1 9.2
Agriculture (HS 01-24) 7.7 7.3 4.8 3.5
Industrial products (HS 25-93) 14.8 14.7 8.5 9.9
Tariff range (%) 0-207.5 0-140 0-200 0-300
Import weighted average (%) 15.5 11.9 9.9
Domestic tariff peaks2 (%) 0.8 2.2 15.8 9.6
International tariff peaks3 (%) 51.3 49.1 25.9 23.8
Coefficient of variation (%) 91 86 170 210
Simple average tariff by stage of processing (%
)
Raw materials 14.6 14.3 1.0 0.9
          Agricultural products 16.9 16.5 0.6 0.5
         Mining products 3.6 3.8 1.0 1.0
         Manufactured products 5.9 5.8 3.2 3.0
Semi-processed products 18.3 15.3 7.0 7.7
Fully processed products 18.1 15.4 11.9 13.6
Notes:   1. As a percentage of total tariff lines
2. Domestic tariff peaks are defined as those exceeding three times the
overall simple average MFN rate.
3. International tariff peaks are defines as those exceeding 15%.
Source: WTO (1998), Tables III.1 and III.4; and WTO (2002), Tables III.1 and
III.2. 
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Table 3:  Nominal Tariff Rates and Dispersion in Selected East Asian Countries,
2000  (%).
Tariff measure All products Primary products Manufacturing
China Mean 17.48 14.27 17.35
CV 71.28 102.31 58.76
Weighted mean 20.5 19.32 16.12
Indonesia Mean 8.43 7.43 16.52
CV 127.76 158.55 119.31
Weighted mean 11.23 5.23 25.58
Malaysia Mean 10.2 5.2 14.7
CV 200.49 181.35 172.24
Weighted mean 13.5 11.87 16.3
Philippines Mean 7.6 6.15 8.36
CV 93.82 56.91 18.90
Weighted mean 7.51 4.83 8.58
Thailand Mean 18.48 16.34 19.32
CV 84.42 48.10 55.40
Weighted mean 16.82 13.75 17.89
Vietnam Mean 16.52 19.3 14.6
CV 113.44 124.5 102.3
Weighted mean 15.2 17.2 13.4
Notes: CV: Coefficient of variation (standard deviation as a percentage of the
mean)
Source: Compiled from individual country tariff schedules available from the Asia
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Secretariat’s online data base,
www.apectariff.org.
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Figure 1:  Malaysia: Growth (1965-2000) and Unemployment (1979-2000), (%)
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